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ABSTRACT 
 
Demand response (DR) is increasingly recognized as an essential ingredient to well-functioning 
electricity markets. DR market potential studies can answer questions about the amount of DR available in a 
given area, from which market segments. Several recent DR market potential studies have been conducted, 
most adapting techniques used to estimate energy-efficiency (EE) potential. In this scoping study, we: 
reviewed and categorized seven recent DR market potential studies; recommended a methodology for 
estimating DR market potential for large, non-residential utility customers that uses price elasticities to 
account for behavior and prices; compiled participation rates and elasticity values from six DR options 
offered to large customers in recent years, and demonstrated our recommended methodology with large 
customer market potential scenarios at an illustrative Northeastern utility. We recommend an elasticity 
approach for large-customer DR options that rely on customer-initiated response to prices. Base-case 
estimates suggest that offering DR options to large, non-residential customers results in 1-3% reductions in 
their class peak demand in response to prices or incentive payments of $500/MWh. Participation rates (i.e., 
enrollment in voluntary DR programs or acceptance of default hourly pricing) have the greatest influence on 
DR impacts of all factors studied, yet are the least well understood. Elasticity refinements to reflect 
customer response at high prices provide more accurate market potential estimates, particularly when arc 
elasticities (rather than substitution elasticities) are estimated. 
 
Introduction 
 
Demand response (DR) is increasingly recognized as an essential ingredient to well functioning 
electricity markets. This growing consensus was formalized in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT), 
which established DR as an official policy of the U.S. government, and directed states (and their electric 
utilities) to consider implementing DR, with a particular focus on “price-based” mechanisms. The resulting 
deliberations, along with a variety of state and regional DR initiatives, are raising important policy 
questions: for example, How much DR is enough? How much is available? From what sources? At what 
cost?  
In this paper, we examine analytical techniques and data sources to support DR market assessments 
that can, in turn, answer the second and third of these questions. We focus on DR for large (> 350 kW), 
commercial and industrial (C&I) customers, although many of the concepts could equally be applied to 
similar programs and tariffs for small commercial and residential customers.1  
A number of utilities and regional groups have performed demand response market potential 
                                                 
1 Our proposed approach may not be appropriate for direct load control programs, which involves cycling or shedding of 
equipment (e.g. air conditioners, water heaters) of residential and small commercial customers. 
studies in recent years.2 Such studies have been conducted primarily to develop the demand-side section 
of utility resource plans, or to assist with planning or screening of potential demand response programs. 
Going forward, in addition to these motivations, we anticipate that market assessments may be useful to 
utilities and state policymakers in their response to EPACT, as a means to help determine the feasibility 
of various demand response options in their service territories. Additionally, some states and regions 
have begun to set demand response goals3; market assessment studies could serve as a foundation to 
ensure that such goals are achievable, and help identify market segments and strategies to meet them. 
In this scoping study, we review analytical methods and data that can support market assessments 
(e.g., for dynamic pricing tariffs) or market potential studies (e.g., for programmatic DR) for DR options 
offered to large commercial, industrial and institutional utility customers. We present a conceptual 
framework for estimating market potential for large customer DR, compile participation rates and elasticity 
values from six large customer dynamic pricing and DR programs and apply them to estimate DR market 
potential in an illustrative utility service territory. Finally, we present a research agenda that identifies 
additional information and improved methods that would support more reliable DR market assessments.  
 
Approaches Used to Study DR Market Potential 
 
We define DR market potential as the amount of DR—measured as short-term load reductions in 
response to high prices or incentive payment offerings—that policymakers can expect to achieve by offering 
a particular set of DR options to groups of similar customers (e.g. market segments) under expected market 
or operating conditions.4  
Studies of DR market potential necessarily involve estimating two separate elements: participation, 
the number of customers enrolling in programs or taking service on a dynamic pricing tariff; and response, 
quantities of load reductions at times of high prices or when curtailment incentives are offered. Among 
seven reviewed DR market potential studies, four distinct approaches were used:5  
• Customer surveys—Participation rates and expected load curtailments are obtained from surveys 
of utility customers about their expected actions if offered hypothetical DR options and used to 
estimate market potential. This approach uses information obtained locally, but the responses are 
subjective—customers may not know what they would actually do (particularly if they have no 
prior DR experience), or may respond strategically. We found only one example of this 
approach. 
• Benchmarking—Participation rates and load reductions observed among customers in other 
jurisdictions are applied to the population of interest. An advantage of this approach is that it 
relies on actual customer experience and actions. However, it assumes that any differences in the 
customers and market context have an insignificant impact on participation and load response. 
Only one of the reviewed studies adopted this approach. 
• Engineering approach—Four of the seven reviewed studies used bottom-up engineering 
techniques, similar to those used to estimate EE market potential. They are variations on the 
                                                 
2 See Haeri and Gage (2006), Quantum Consulting and Summit Blue Consulting (2004), SCE (2003), and EPRI Solutions (2005).  
3 For example, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) has set demand response goals for the state’s investor-owned 
utilities and the Northwest Power and Conservation Council proposed a regional goal of 500 MW of demand response in its 5th 
Power Plan. 
4 DR market potential can be expressed as a percentage reduction in market demand that can be expected at, for example, a price 
(or offered curtailment incentive) of $500/MWh. 
5 See Appendix A of Goldman et al. (2007) for a summary of the reviewed studies and their methods. 
approach of applying assumed participation and response rates to data on local customers, loads 
or equipment stock. These rates are typically assumed to be constant, regardless of price or 
incentive levels. 
• Elasticity approach—This approach, adopted by one of the reviewed studies, involves 
estimating price elasticities from the usage data of customers exposed to DR programs and/or 
dynamic pricing tariffs. After determining an expected participation level, price elasticities are 
applied to the population of interest to estimate load impacts under an expected range of prices 
or level of financial incentives to curtail load. Like the benchmarking approach, elasticities are 
based on actual customer response. They also quantify the relationship between customer 
behavior (i.e., load reductions) and price. When demand models are used to estimate elasticities, 
variables can be introduced to account for customer- or market-specific factors that influence 
price response, enabling the translation of results to other jurisdictions that may vary in these 
factors. 
 
We make the following observations and recommendations on methods for estimating DR market 
potential: 
• For residential and small commercial direct load control programs, customer load impact 
estimates can be derived from bottom-up engineering approaches or statistical evaluations of 
samples of participating customers with appropriate metering. 
• For large customer DR options that rely on customer-initiated response to prices (e.g., hourly or 
critical-peak pricing) or curtailment incentives (e.g., short notice emergency or price response 
event programs), we recommend an elasticity approach.6 
• Participation should be thought of in terms of market penetration in a given year. Unfortunately, 
participation is the most difficult aspect of DR options to estimate, due to a limited experience 
base. With time and experience, this should improve. 
• Because of the limited experience base for many DR options, approaches that rely on customer 
survey response to hypothetical DR options, or benchmarking, are probably not all that 
meaningful. The “best practices” approach, which has been used in some EE market potential 
studies, makes most sense when there is a larger experience base (i.e., mature programs offered 
by many utilities or ISOs over a lengthy period). 
 
A Framework for Estimating Large Customer DR Market Potential 
 
We propose a framework for estimating large customer DR market potential in a given jurisdiction 
or utility service territory that involves five steps: 
• Establishing the study scope—identifying the target population and types of DR options to be 
considered; 
• Customer segmentation—identifying “customer market segments” among the target population; 
• Estimating net program penetration rates—using available data to estimate customer enrollment 
in voluntary programs and customer exposure to default pricing programs; 
                                                 
6 We note, however, that DR programs involving reserve or capacity payments and/or penalties for non-response (e.g., 
interruptible rates, capacity programs) present difficulties in estimating elasticities, because customer incentives are less clearly 
tied to individual events.  
• Estimating price response—selecting an appropriate measure of price response (price elasticity 
of demand, substitution elasticity or arc elasticity) given available data, and developing elasticity 
estimates for various DR options, customer market segments, and factors found to influence 
price response from the observed load response of customers exposed to DR options; and 
• Estimating load impacts—combining the above steps to estimate the expected DR that can be 
expected from the target population at a reference price. 
 
We applied this methodology, using available data on large customer participation and response, to 
estimate the market potential for several DR options at an illustrative urban utility.  
 
Establishing the Study Scope 
We limited our analysis to large, non-residential customers with peak demand greater than 350 kW 
and examined the five different types of DR option described in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. DR Options Included in Market Potential Simulation 
DR Option Description 
Optional hourly 
pricing 
• A dynamic pricing tariff with bundled charges for delivery and commodity offered on an optional 
basis 
• Typical rate design is a two-part structure, in which a customer baseline load (CBL) is established 
and billed at an otherwise-applicable tariff rate (either TOU or flat rate), with deviations in actual 
usage above and below the CBL billed at hourly prices  
Default hourly 
pricing 
• A dynamic pricing tariff, in which commodity costs are unbundled from other rate components (e.g. 
distribution and transmission charges), offered as default service in states with retail competition 
•  Commodity usage is billed at an hourly rate, typically indexed to an organized wholesale energy 
market (e.g. day-ahead or real-time energy market)  
Short-notice 
emergency 
program 
• A program that offers customers financial incentives for curtailing load when called by a program 
operator on short notice (i.e., 1-2 hours) in response to system emergencies 
• Typically, customer response is voluntary (i.e., in some programs, no penalties are levied for not 
curtailing when called) 
Price-response 
event program 
• A program that pays customers for measured load reductions when day-ahead wholesale market 
prices exceed a floor 
• Some programs may include bid requirements (i.e., customers are only paid for curtailments that 
they specify in advance) and/or penalties for failing to respond when committed  
Critical-peak 
pricing 
• A dynamic-pricing tariff similar to a time-of-use rate most of the time, with the exception that on 
declared “critical-peak” days, a pre-specified higher price comes into effect for a specific time 
period  
 
We analyzed these options independently and did not account for possible interactions between 
different options should they be offered simultaneously to a given set of customers. Thus, our results likely 
overestimate the combined market potential for these DR programs and dynamic pricing tariffs should two 
or more of them be offered to the same customers at once. 
Our data sources for participation rates and price elasticities for each of these DR options are 
provided in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Data Sources 
DR Option Data Source(s) Eligible 
Customers 
(peak 
demand) 
Reference 
Optional hourly 
pricing 
Central and Southwest (CSW) Utilities’ (now 
American Electric Power) two-part RTP rate 
> 1,500 kW Boisvert et al. (2004) 
Default hourly 
pricing 
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC), 
a National Grid Company, SC-3A tariff 
> 2000 kW Goldman et al. (2005) 
NYISO Emergency DR Program (EDRP) > 100 kW Neenan et al. (2003) Short-notice 
emergency 
program 
 
ISO-NE Real-Time DR (RTDR) Program > 100 kW RLW Analytics and Neenan 
Associates (2003, 2004 and 2005) 
Price-response 
event program 
ISO-NE Real-Time Price Response (RTPR) 
Program 
> 100 kW  RLW Analytics and Neenan 
Associates (2003, 2004 and 2005) 
Critical-peak 
pricing 
California Utilities1 Critical Peak Pricing 
Program 
> 200 kW;  
> 100 kW for 
SDG&E 
Quantum Consulting, Inc. and 
Summit Blue Consulting, LLC (2004 
and 2006) 
1 Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E), Southern California Edison (SCE) and San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E) offer a critical-peak 
pricing tariff to large customers. The tariff design is quite different from that of the California Statewide Pricing Pilot that 
primarily targeted residential customers (Charles River Associates 2005). 
 
Customer Segmentation 
Analysts conducting DR market potential studies should use available information about the target 
population to identify customer market segments that are expected to respond in similar ways, or that could 
be approached with specific marketing strategies or program designs. 
For this study, we adopted five market segments based on SIC codes—manufacturing, 
government/education, commercial/retail, healthcare, and public works—that Goldman et al. (2005) found 
to be well correlated with differences in large, non-residential customers’ willingness to participate in and 
respond to DR options. 
 
Estimating Net Program Penetration Rates 
The next step is to estimate customer participation rates for DR options included in the study. 
Participation can imply: (1) customer enrollment in voluntary DR programs and tariffs, or (2) the retention 
of customers in tariffs implemented as the default service (i.e., the number of customers who do not switch 
to an alternative offering).  
DR participation is often fluid. Customers may enroll in a program for one or more years, and 
subsequently drop out. They may subsequently re-enroll in the program, or others may take their place. The 
benefits of customer participation are generally only realized while the customer is enrolled in the program 
(or exposed to hourly prices).7 Thus, participation in DR options can be viewed as penetration in a given 
year “n” (or other applicable timeframe), as follows:  
 
Penetrationn = participantsn-1 – dropoutsn + new enrolleesn 
                                                 
7 However, the experience of responding to a particular program may provide benefits beyond that particular program if the 
customer subsequently exhibits DR behavior in other programs or dynamic pricing options that were learned in the initial program.  
 
This can be estimated separately for each customer market segment defined in the previous step, and 
the results added up to determine the overall penetration for the population of eligible customers. 
This way of thinking about DR potential is useful for evaluating an established program over multiple 
years, particularly in the context of changes to program rules or incentives, or to the level and/or volatility of 
market prices. From the standpoint of a new, hypothetical program, it may be acceptable to view 
participation as penetration in a “typical” year of a mature program, with the understanding that a multi-year 
ramp-up period will be necessary, and that ongoing penetration may be subject to fluctuations due to factors 
both within and out of the program operator’s control. 
Analysts have used a number of methods to estimate penetration rates of DR programs (see Goldman 
et al. (2007) for discussion of various approaches). Each has pros and cons, in part because there is not yet a 
broad set of information on customer response to various DR options in a variety of settings. Program 
penetration rates present the largest uncertainty in this framework, because experience is piecemeal, and 
because of data limitations. We strongly recommend evaluating the impact of a range of participation levels, 
rather than relying on a single point estimate.  
We compiled participation rates by market segment and customer size for each DR option in our 
simulation (see Table 3). Our goal was to gather data on program participation based on relatively mature 
programs with 3–4 years of operation. Where possible, we used actual program participation data from the 
data sources in Table 2. We filled in gaps by surveying program managers of similar programs and tariffs, 
and inferring data from other market segments or programs; these data are indicated in red italic font in 
Table 3.8 
The highest participation rates are observed for large customers (>1 MW) in the default hourly 
pricing tariff. We believe this is largely explained by the default nature of the tariff—participation is defined 
as not selecting an alternative electricity supplier, rather than as the conscious decision to sign up that 
characterizes the other programs and tariffs.9 
Another factor that strongly impacts participation rates is the definition and size of the eligible 
customer population. For the default hourly pricing tariff, only a specific set of large customers, with peak 
demand above 2 MW were eligible. In contrast, the other DR programs were open to significantly wider 
classes of customers. The threshold for the critical-peak pricing program was 100 or 200 kW (depending on 
the utility). For the ISO programs, eligibility is defined not by customer size class, but by a minimum 
allowable load reduction (i.e., 100 kW). To develop participation rates, we constructed the pool of eligible 
customers, assuming that the 100 kW minimum load reduction would be feasible among customers with 
peak demands of 350 kW and above10—thus, a very large number of non-residential customers in New York 
and the New England states were considered “eligible” for the ISO programs. Consequently, even though 
the actual number of participants (100–400 customers) is comparable across the programs and tariffs, the 
denominators range from hundreds to thousands of eligible customers. 
A number of additional factors may influence rates of customer participation in DR programs and 
tariffs, including: program design features such as the structure and level of incentive payments, penalties 
for non-performance, and the duration, frequency and advance notice of events; customer familiarity with or 
                                                 
8 For the two short-notice emergency programs, information on the number of participating customers was available from NYISO 
and ISO-NE. However, neither agency collects information on the number of customers eligible for their programs. We 
constructed eligible population data from information obtained from third party sources (see Goldman et al. 2007). 
9 The default hourly pricing participation rates do not include those customers that switched to competitive retailers and entered 
into contracts in which they faced hourly prices indexed to day-ahead or real-time markets for some or all of their load. 
10 Though allowed in the program rules, load aggregators were not that active in these short-notice emergency DR programs 
(although they were active in the NYISO ICAP/SCR program). With aggregation, the pool of “eligible” customers would be even 
less well-defined.  
reputation of the entity administering the program; the effectiveness of marketing and/or customer education 
efforts; and the availability of technical or financial assistance. 
 
Table 3. Participation Rates in DR Programs and Dynamic Pricing Tariffs 
Customer Size (peak demand) DR Option Business Type 
0.35–0.5 MW 0.5–1 MW 1–2 MW >2 MW 
Commercial/retail 0% 0% 1% 2% 
Government/education 3% 4% 6% 25% 
Healthcare 0% 0% 1% 2% 
Manufacturing 3% 5% 6% 25% 
Optional 
hourly pricing 
 
Public works 0% 0% 3% 20% 
Commercial/retail 4.3% 11% 50% 43% 
Government/education 4.2% 10% 30% 42% 
Healthcare 0.7% 1.8% 50% 7.1% 
Manufacturing 3.3% 8.3% 29% 33% 
Default hourly 
pricing 
 
Public works 3.7% 9.2% 50% 37% 
Commercial/retail 1.2% 23% 5.5% 20% 
Government/education 0.3% 5.3% 2.6% 9% 
Healthcare 0.6% 4.2% 4.3% 22% 
Manufacturing 0.2% 15% 17% 23% 
Short-notice 
emergency 
program 
 
 
Public works 1.1% 10% 67% 17% 
Commercial/retail 0.3% 0.8% 1.8% 5.7% 
Government/education 0.3% 2.9% 4.1% 10% 
Healthcare 0.3% 1.6% 8.9% 22% 
Manufacturing 5.7% 10% 9.1% 30% 
Price-response 
event program 
Public works 0.1% 0.2% 0.4% 1.1% 
Commercial/retail 0.9% 3.1% 5.2% 4.2% 
Government/education 1.5% 4.1% 2.3% 1.9% 
Healthcare 0.9% 3.1% 5.2% 4.2% 
Manufacturing 0.9% 4.5% 7.3% 6.9% 
Critical-peak 
pricing 
 
Public works 1.2% 3.3% 1.3% 2.8% 
Note: Red-italicized figures are based on expert judgment. 
 
Estimating Price Response 
The next step in this framework is to assign price elasticities to each customer market segment, for 
each type of DR option, using available information on how similar customers have responded to high prices 
or program events afforded by similar DR options. 
Analysts typically measure consumer response to changes in electricity prices with one of three 
measures of price elasticity: the price elasticity of demand, the elasticity of substitution, and the arc price 
elasticity of demand. All are estimated from a sample of observed customer electricity usage data in the face 
of changing prices.  
From a theoretical standpoint, the price elasticity of demand (also known as the “own-price” 
elasticity) provides the most consistent characterization of consumer behavior. However, its estimation 
requires data on customers’ production output, or the utility they derive from electricity usage, that is 
usually not available.11 A number of studies of large customer price response have instead estimated 
substitution elasticities, which are also grounded in economic theory and can be estimated without output 
data, but impose assumptions about how customers use electricity. Arc elasticities are much easier to 
compute (only a limited number of observations of customer loads and prices are necessary) but this comes 
at the cost of limited explanatory power.  
The tradeoffs between theoretical consistency and the amount of data required to estimate these three 
elasticity measures are summarized in Figure 1. As a general rule of thumb, analysts should choose the 
measure with the greatest theoretical consistency possible given available data.  
For each DR option included in our simulation, we calculated elasticity values, disaggregated by 
market segment, using individual customer load and price data. For the two hourly pricing tariffs, we 
estimated demand models to calculate substitution elasticities.12 For the other programs, insufficient 
numbers of observations covering too small a range of prices were available to estimate a fully specified 
demand model, so we calculated arc elasticities. 13 The resulting average elasticity values estimated for each 
program and market segment are presented in Table 4.14 
 
 
Figure 1. Features of Price Elasticity Measures 
 
Studies of customer price response indicate that there is considerable diversity in how customers 
respond to similar prices and incentives, even among customer market segments. External factors—such as 
high-price or program event characteristics and weather—and customer-specific characteristics or 
circumstances—such as customer experience, ownership of onsite generation and other enabling 
                                                 
11 Those analysts that have estimated own-price elasticities derived a proxy for firm output or customer utility that assumes a 
cyclical pattern. 
12 For more details, see Goldman et al. (2005) and Boisvert et al. (2004). 
13 Substitution and arc elasticity values are not directly comparable, although the market potential impacts derived from them are. 
14 For the price response event program, a number of program events occurred when prices were quite low ($100–150/MWh). 
Including observations from these low-price events resulted in extremely high average elasticities, because there was considerable 
variation in loads, but relatively small price differentials. To remove this “noise” from the elasticity estimates, we restricted our 
analysis to observations where the price was $150/MWh or higher. 
technologies, and electricity intensity—may influence price response. Unfortunately, insufficient 
information was available among our data sources to evaluate the impacts of most such factors (see 
Goldman et al. 2007).  
 
Table 4. Average Elasticity Values 
DR Option Customer Market Segment 
Optional 
Hourly Pricing
Default Hourly 
Pricing 
Short-notice 
Emergency 
Program 
Price Response 
Event Program 
Critical-peak 
Pricing 
Commercial/retail 0.01 0.06 -0.03 -0.09 -0.10 
Government/education 0.01 0.10 -0.02 -0.16 -0.06 
Healthcare 0.01 0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 
Manufacturing 0.26 0.16 -0.04 -0.16 -0.05 
Public works 0.07 0.02 -0.08 -0.22 -0.08 
Note: Elasticity of substitution values are shown for optional and default hourly pricing; arc elasticity values are shown for all other DR options. 
 
We were able to refine the elasticity estimates to reflect customer response at high prices (> 
$450/MWh). The base case elasticity estimates were evaluated over a range of prices, and this refinement 
tests the sensitivity of the estimates to this assumption.15 Our market potential simulations assume an 
“event” (or high hourly) price of $500/MWh, so this refinement brings the elasticity estimates in closer 
alignment with the simulated conditions. 
For the default hourly pricing option, high-price substitution elasticities were developed using a 
flexible model that allowed for statistical evaluation of response at different price thresholds (see Goldman 
et al. 2005). We applied adjustment factors derived from this model to each market segment to develop 
elasticities tailored to response at high prices. 
For the arc-elasticity values calculated from the DR programs, we simply eliminated observations for 
which the event price was below $450/MWh, and recomputed average elasticities for each sector and 
program from this smaller set of observations. 
The resulting elasticity values are presented in Table 5. For the default hourly pricing tariff, 
commercial/retail and government/education customers increase their response at high prices while there is 
no change in manufacturing customers’ response.  
Very few of the observations for the two short-notice emergency programs involved event prices 
lower than $450/MWh, so the revised elasticity estimates are essentially unchanged.16 
For the price response event program and critical-peak pricing, the elasticities decrease compared to 
the averages in Table 4 in all market segments. This occurs because these customers’ load response (the 
numerator in the arc elasticity) was fairly consistent across the range of prices, while the price differential 
(the denominator) increases with higher event prices. We believe that this result may be partly attributable to 
the program design and is also consistent with the notion that many large business and institutional 
customers are only willing to curtail or forego load which they consider “discretionary.” Restricting the 
                                                 
15 Applying average elasticities derived from a range of price levels to estimate response to a specific price may be misleading if 
customers respond differently at different price thresholds. Goldman et al. (2005) found statistically significant differences in 
customer price response at different prices. 
16 The program design of the NYISO EDRP program sets a floor price of $500/MWh, so none of these observations were 
removed. ISO-NE’s emergency program offers two floor-price options—$500/MWh and $250/MWh—depending on the amount 
of notice customers receive of impending events. 
dataset to events with higher prices therefore results in lower average elasticities. This effect is relatively 
minor for the critical-peak pricing example, but is quite pronounced for the price response event program. 
 
Table 5. Elasticities Based on Customer Response to High Prices ($500/MWh) 
DR Option Customer Market Segment 
Default Hourly 
Pricing 
Short-notice 
Emergency 
Program 
Price Response 
Event Program 
Critical-peak 
Pricing 
Commercial/retail 0.10 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 
Government/education 0.16 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 
Healthcare 0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.00 
Manufacturing 0.16 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 
Public works 0.01 -0.08 -0.02 -0.05 
Note: Elasticity of substitution values are shown for optional and default hourly pricing; arc elasticity values are shown for all other DR options. 
 
Estimating Load Impacts 
The final step is to pull together all the pieces to estimate aggregate load impacts. This should be 
done separately for each DR option under consideration.17  
For each customer market segment, program penetration rates should be applied to the target 
population in that segment. Then, elasticity values are applied to the customers in each market segment, 
allocating any factor-specific elasticity estimates (such as those developed for customers with and without 
onsite generation in the previous section) to those customers to whom they apply. 
Once each customer has been assigned an elasticity value, it remains to translate the results into an 
estimate of aggregate load impacts for a range of expected prices or incentive levels. If the price elasticity of 
demand was used to characterize customer response, load impacts can be calculated directly for a given 
price. For substitution and arc elasticities, this task is somewhat more complicated and the methods for 
doing so are not well established. We describe a method for each type of elasticity. 
 
Estimating Load Impacts from Arc Elasticities. Given a set of prices, it is fairly simple to derive the 
percentage change in load from arc elasticity values using the following formula: 
(4) ( )% BARC
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,  
where σARC is the elasticity value, P is the program’s incentive payment rate (or dynamic pricing tariff’s 
applicable rate during the high-price event), and PB is the retail price the customer would normally face 
(the background rate).18 If an analyst knows something about the expected level of load—i.e., the 
customer baseline load (CBL)—during an event, then the percentage change in load can be translated 
into an estimate of the level of demand response according to the following formula: 
 
(5) ( )1 %CBLDR Q L= − × × ∆  
                                                 
17 Analysts may wish to account for interactive effects arising from program eligibility rules that limit participation in multiple 
programs. 
18 If the customer’s otherwise applicable tariff is a time-of-use rate, then PB should be the period price coincident with the timing 
of the event. 
Estimating Load Impacts from Substitution Elasticities. Because the elasticity of substitution assumes 
that customers substitute peak for off-peak electricity, it is necessary to establish the proportion of electricity 
costs that are allocated to both these periods. Customers are also assumed to respond vis-à-vis the average 
price in each period, both in terms of the nominal changes in the peak and off-peak prices from their average 
levels, as well as the relative prices in the two periods. As a result, the following separate formulae are used 
to estimate peak load reductions and off-peak load expansion:19 
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, 
where Co is the off-peak-period cost share as a percentage of the total daily electricity cost (e.g. 50%, 
75%, etc.), Cp is the peak-period cost share as a percentage of the total daily electricity cost, Po is the 
actual off-peak period price, Pp is the actual peak period price, oP  and pP are the average off-peak and 
peak period prices. Applying equation (5) to equation (6) produces an estimate of the level of demand 
response (i.e., load reductions during peak periods). Similarly, applying equation (5) to equation (7) 
provides an estimate of the load impacts in off-peak periods (i.e., increase in load due to load shifting). 
Once the load impacts have been established (in MW), they can be expressed as a percentage of the 
peak demand of the applicable customer class. 
 
Case Studies: DR Market Potential at an Illustrative Northeast Utility 
 
To demonstrate the application of our methodology, we applied our compiled participation rate and 
elasticity values to information on the customer population of an urban utility in the Northeastern U.S. to 
develop market potential estimates. The selected utility is relatively small; the peak demand of its large, 
non-residential customers is ~1,700 MW. These customers represent about 40% of the utility’s peak 
demand, and consist largely of commercial/retail, government/education and healthcare facilities. 
Manufacturing customers are less prevalent than is typical among utilities that serve suburban or rural 
communities. 
 To estimate load impacts, we used business-class-specific load profiles derived from NMPC SC-3A 
customer data to establish “expected” customer loads absent DR (i.e., customer baseline loads). We also 
assumed an “event” (or high hourly) price of $500/MWh for all DR options. This is fairly typical of the high 
prices observed in hourly pricing programs, as well as incentive floor prices offered by ISO emergency 
programs, in recent years. 
We developed five scenarios to demonstrate the effects of various factors on DR market potentials 
and to evaluate the robustness of the substitution and arc elasticities to changes in the simulation inputs;we 
highlight results from several of the scenarios (see Goldman et al (2007) for complete results). 
 
Base Case. The base-case scenario uses average elasticity values by market segment (Table 4), and the 
participation rates in Table 3 to estimate market potential for each DR option. The results range from <1% 
                                                 
19 These formulae assume the use of an Allen-partial elasticity of substitution.  
to 3% of the peak demand of the target population of customers larger than 350 kW (see Table 6).20 The 
load reductions for the largest customers (>1 MW) enrolled in the default hourly pricing and price response 
event programs represent 5-6% of their aggregate peak demand. The highest market potential (3% of peak 
demand) corresponds to the default hourly pricing tariff—this is largely due to relatively high customer 
acceptance rates for this tariff. 
 
Table 6. Market Potential Results: Base Case 
Optional Hourly 
Pricing 
Default Hourly 
Pricing 
Short-notice 
Emergency 
Program 
Price Response 
Event Program 
Critical-peak 
Pricing 
Customer 
Size 
(MW) 
MW % of class 
peak 
demand1 
MW % of class 
peak 
demand1 
MW % of class 
peak 
demand1 
MW % of class 
peak 
demand1 
MW % of class 
peak 
demand1 
0.35–0.5  1.0 0% 2.8 0% 0.4 0% 1.6 0% 1.3 0% 
0.5–1 1.1 0% 3.9 1% 4.3 1% 3.0 1% 1.7 1% 
1–2 1.9 1% 14.4 6% 3.8 2% 3.9 2% 1.9 1% 
> 2 21.6 4% 34.8 6% 11.5 2% 29.1 5% 2.4 0% 
Total 25.6 2% 55.9 3% 19.9 1% 37.6 2% 7.3 <1% 
1 Peak demand is non-coincident. 
Note: Each DR option was evaluated separately—the results are not additive. 
 
Impact of Program Participation Rates. Market assessments often examine the impact of differing rates 
of participation on program potential. Figure 2 illustrates the impact of aggressively marketing programs or 
promoting optional tariffs to achieve two and three times the base-case participation rates, which reflect 
current DR experience. The results, on the order of 3–6% of non-residential peak demand, can be viewed as 
an approximate upper bound on DR potentials.21 For default hourly pricing, which by definition would not 
be marketed to customers, we do not show enhanced participation, although the base-case results are 
included in the figure for comparison.  
 
Accounting for Response at High Prices. In this scenario, we refined the elasticity estimates of four of the 
program types to better reflect customer response at the $500/MWh event price assumed for these 
simulations. Comparing the results in Table 7 with the base case (Table 6) reveals that for the default 
hourly pricing program, accounting for differences in response at higher prices results in higher market 
potential (i.e., 74 versus 55 MW). This result is driven by the fact that customers in certain market segments 
(government/education and commercial/retail) were more price-responsive at higher prices and our 
illustrative utility had a high proportion of these types of customers.  
 
                                                 
20 We did not have access to class-level peak demand for the Northeastern utility. To approximate class-peak demand, we summed 
individual customers’ peak demands. Because they are not simultaneous, this overestimates the actual class peak (and therefore 
under-estimates the proportional load impacts).  
21 These results assume that the additional enrolled customers are just as responsive to price signals or emergencies as the 
relatively “early adopters” observed among our data sources. In reality, it may be that the most responsive customers are also the 
first to sign up, leading to declining average elasticities as more customers enroll. On the other hand, strategies that combine 
program marketing with technical assistance to develop fully automated DR could enhance both participation rates and response to 
prices or emergencies. 
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Note: Elasticities are assumed constant over all participation scenarios—this assumption has yet to be evaluated with actual 
program experience. 
Figure 2. Impact of Program Participation on DR Market Potential 
 
Table 7. Market Potential Results: Response at High Prices 
Default Hourly Pricing Short-notice 
Emergency Program 
Price Response Event 
Program 
Critical-peak Pricing Customer Size 
(MW) 
MW % of class 
peak demand1 
MW % of class 
peak demand1
MW % of class 
peak demand1 
MW % of class 
peak demand1
0.35–0.5  4.1 1% 0.4 0% 0.3 0% 0.7 0% 
0.5–1 5.7 2% 4.2 1% 0.5 0% 1.0 0% 
1–2 19.2 8% 3.7 2% 0.7 0% 1.0 0% 
> 2 45.3 8% 11.1 2% 5.1 1% 1.3 0% 
Total 74.2 4% 19.4 1% 6.6 0% 4.1 0% 
1 Peak demand is non-coincident. 
Note: Each DR option was evaluated separately—the results are not additive. 
 
In contrast, for the price response event program and critical-peak pricing, restricting observations to 
only high-price events resulted in lower average arc elasticities in all market segments. The arc elasticity 
values are lower for these options because participating customers provided similar load reductions at low 
prices (~$200/MWh) as they did above $450/MWh (i.e., the percentage change in load remains the same 
during the high price event hours, while the percentage change in price increases). As a result, the market 
potential estimates are lower for these two programs than the base case that used average elasticities across 
all observed prices. Because the short-notice emergency program elasticities were virtually unchanged (see 
Table 5), the difference in market potential relative to the base case is negligible. 
This scenario demonstrates the limitations of arc elasticities in accounting for influences other than 
price on customer load changes. Because only prices and load at a single event are captured, there is no way 
to account or correct for noise in the estimates (i.e. other factors that drive changes in customer usage). At 
higher prices, we believe that changes in load are more likely a result of prices rather than other factors. 
When arc elasticities are used, it is therefore important to be cognizant of these limitations and ensure that 
observations are drawn from conditions similar to those being simulated. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The above simulations illustrate possible ranges of DR market potential for large commercial and 
industrial customers at an urban Northeast utility, as well as several methodological and data issues. The 
results are tied to the characteristics of this urban utility’s large customer base as well as the specific 
assumptions we made about prices and other factors in the various scenarios. Nonetheless, we draw the 
following insights and conclusions from our scoping study of DR market potential: 
• We believe that the results provide a reasonable first approximation of the range of DR 
market potential among non-residential customers if offered similar DR options by similar 
utilities. While the observed load reductions—1% to 3% of the peak demand of the target 
population of large customers—are modest, a number of studies suggest that a little DR can 
often go a long way towards ameliorating system emergencies or high prices. If policymakers or 
regulators establish higher DR goals, then our results suggest that the DR market potential of all 
customer classes should be considered—not just large commercial and industrial customers. 
Pilot program results suggest that enabling technologies and automated DR can also increase 
both the number of customers willing to participate in DR options as well as the predictability 
and consistency of their load response.  
• The simulations illustrate the relative impact of certain factors, particularly customer 
participation rates, on potential aggregate load reductions of large customers. Participation 
rates currently represent the largest data uncertainty for analysts undertaking market potential 
studies. Yet achieving higher participation rates among eligible large customers is critical for 
obtaining a significant amount of price-responsive load. Assessment of DR potential should 
attempt to account for the level of program resources (e.g. education, training, technical 
assistance) that will be devoted to program implementation and which may influence 
participation rates.  
• The scenarios also demonstrate the importance of refining elasticity estimates rather than 
applying average values. In several cases, this resulted in lower market potential estimates in 
our simulations. Policymakers considering establishing DR goals should be aware that goals 
extrapolated from pilot programs or DR potential study estimates based only on small samples of 
very responsive customers may not be achievable. 
• Finally, we emphasize that all DR market potential studies should examine a range of 
scenarios—not limited to those demonstrated here—in estimating DR market potential. 
 
Recommendations 
 
To advance the state of knowledge about customer response to DR programs and dynamic pricing 
tariffs and facilitate DR market assessments, we recommend that state and federal policymakers and 
regulators encourage utilities, retailersand Independent System Operators/Regional Transmission 
Organizations and their program evaluators conduct the following activities:  
1. Link Program Evaluation to Market Potential Studies: Evaluations of DR programs should 
systematically collect data on the characteristics of participating customers; hourly customer loads 
and prices; other factors found to be relevant drivers of customer participation and response; and 
information on the size and characteristics of the target or eligible population. 
2. Program Participation: Develop predictive methods for estimating participation rates in DR 
programs and dynamic pricing tariffs that incorporate customer characteristics and other factors that 
drive participation. Where applicable, studies should include interactive effects of multiple program 
offerings in estimating market penetration rates. 
3. Price Response: Estimate price elasticity values for different market segments, accounting for the 
relative impact of driving factors, and report methods and results transparently. Where possible, we 
recommend that provisions be made to estimate demand or substitution elasticities, using fully 
specified demand models, rather than arc elasticities.  
4. Assess the Impacts of DR-Enabling Technologies: For large customers, there is still a need to 
document the impacts of specific DR enabling technologies on customer participation and load 
response, given limited evidence and mixed results from existing evaluations. At a minimum, 
program evaluators should gather information on customer’s load curtailment strategies that involve 
onsite generation,22 peak load controls, energy management control systems, energy information 
systems, and any other technologies disseminated as part of technical assistance programs. 
5. Publicize Results: Explore ways to pool customer-level data, while protecting customer 
confidentiality, so that information to support DR market assessments is available in a standardized 
format. 
 
These activities would provide more detailed and robust price response and participation rate values 
that can support DR market assessment activities. However, in order to make best use of this information, 
utilities, ISOs/RTOs, and states will need disaggregated information on the characteristics of their target 
population of customers (e.g., customer loads by size range, market segments, enabling technology 
deployment). Some of this information is not typically collected by utilities on their customers. Therefore, 
we recommend that states, utilities and their consultants conducting DR market assessments first assess 
the availability of information on customer characteristics and usage in their jurisdictions and include plans 
to collect or estimate any necessary incremental information in their study plans and budgets. 
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